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proach often taken by the Seventh Circuit courts, then, is not at all con-
sistent with the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Nolan
case.
Consequently diversity decisions of the courts of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, may suffer to some extent from the very maladies Erie and subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions were designed to cure. First, to the extent
there is an element of independent judgment involved in the federal
court's formulation of applicable state law, litigants in a diversity case are
getting a type of pre-Erie general law which may not correspond to the
law litigants would obtain were they in a state court. Second, and per-
haps more basic, a federal court exercising a type of independent judg-
ment can effectively frustrate valid state policies manifested in state court
definitions of state-created rights and obligations. By independently de-
fining a state-created right or obligation, the federal court can alter the
state policy embodied in the right or obligation. On the other hand, the
Nolan prediction formula, if followed by the federal courts, would not
only minimize the inequities of forum-shopping but also force federal
recognition and respect for valid state policies. It is, of course, the thesis
of this note that the lower federal courts should adopt the prediction
formula of the Nolan case not only because it was specifically endorsed
by the Supreme Court but also because it best effectuates the basic policies
underlying the Erie decision.
THE EFFECT OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION ON
STATE LITIGATION
Before the Constitution was adopted there was a clear conception of
the need for a federal jurisdiction in cases of diverse citizenship,1 and the
Constitution ultimately provided that:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity,
arising . . . between a State and citizens of another State;-
between citizens of different States,
The essence of diversity jurisdiction is the availability of federal tribunals
for controversies concerning matters which, in themselves, are outside the
domain of federal power and within state authority; and it is founded
1. Paul Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of
Different States Be Preserved, 18 A.B.A.J. 499, 500 (1932).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
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on assuring to non-resident litigants courts free from potential local
bias.8 The proper allocation of authority between United States and
state courts is but part of the perennial concern over the wise distribution
of power between the states and the nation.' Furthermore, the "happy
relation of states to nation-our abiding political problem-is in no small
measure dependent on the wisdom with which the scope and limits of the
federal courts are determined." 5  Congress determines the "scope and
limits" of the federal courts; and interpretation of article three of the
Constitution by the federal courts indicates that its provisions are not
self-executing and that Congress has the power to withdraw diversity
jurisdiction from the federal courts and deprive citizens of the benefit of
the constitutional provision insofar as the federal system is concerned.6
This grant of judicial power has never been thought to imply a duty by
Congress to employ it, and policy has always determined when and to
what extent judicial power should be exercised.7 Diversity jurisdiction
has therefore been the subject of almost continuous legislative compro-
mise,' and whether the power should be exercised at all has been the sub-
ject of a prolonged debate.' In fact, in 1930 and 1932, the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee under Senator Norris reported out bills to abolish di-
3. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928) ; THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Hamilton).
4. Frankfurter, supra note 3, at 506.
5. Id. at 500.
6. 104 CONG. REc. 12687 (1958) (remarks of Representative Celler).
7. Frankfurter, supra note 3, at 514.
8. Id. at 507. The first Judiciary Act provided that: "... the circuit courts shall
have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive
of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and .. . an alien is a party, or the
suit is between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
state. . . ." - 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789).
Since then, the diversity jurisdiction section has been amended fourteen times. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1964 Supp.) ; Frankfurter, supra note 3, at 512-515. The most recent
amendment was enacted Aug. 14, 1964. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1964 Supp.). Presently,
diversity jurisdiction is in the Federal Judicial Code as follows:
Sec. 1332. Diversity of citizenship
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different states;
(2) citizens of a state, and foreign states or citizens or subjects there-
of; and
(3) citizens of different states and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties ...
(c) For the purposes of this section . . . of this title, a corporation shall
be deemed a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated and
of the state where it has its principal place of business .
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1959).
9. Quigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60 MIcH. L. Rtv. 1031(1958).
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versity jurisdiction."
The problem of what to do with diversity jurisdiction continues to
be the subject of active debate today. Some feel that what is needed is a
"total reconsideration of the jurisdiction, guided by the principle that
federal judicial energy should be preserved for vindication of those in-
terests, which, because the Congress has considered them of national im-
portance, have become the subject of the federal substantive law.""
Those who have attempted such a reconsideration have often reached dif-
fering conclusions. Some feel that the scales tip decidedly in favor of
abolishing the current brand of diversity jurisdiction, 2 while others feel
that diversity jurisdiction is essential to the proper administration of
justice under our federalism and should be retained in substantially its
present form. 8
As part of this dispute, the American Law Institute (ALI) has pro-
posed stricter limitations on access to the federal courts in diversity
cases.'" The ALI premises its entire plan of revision of diversity juris-
diction upon the assumption that federal diversity jurisdiction interferes
with state autonomy; but nowhere does the Institute explore the implica-
tions of the assumption. The purpose of this note is to test the validity
of the assumption by investigating, discussing, and evaluating the effects
that federal diversity cases have on state judicial process. The note's
scope is limited to state judicial process because it was not feasible to in-
clude the effects of diversity cases on legislation, administrative prac-
tices, and daily commercial intercourse.
One possibility of interference which this note will consider is that
the very fact that federal courts are deciding questions of purely state law
may be an infringement of state autonomy because there is no state con-
trol and review of federal decisions applying state law.'" As a result, it
10. Id. at 1045. See S REP. No. 530, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) ; S. REP. No. 691,
71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930).
11. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, at 238 (1948).
12. Quigley, supra note 10, at 1047.
13. John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7 (1963-
64) ; John J. Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 407
(1956).
14. ALI, DivisION OF JURISDICTiON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1964).
15. Id. at 49. Briefly, some of the other arguments rejected by the ALI are:
1) the nationalizing functions of diversity jurisdiction, although important historically,
have no present relevance to the problem; 2) the social and economic incentives to inter-
state movement and business today are so great as to override any risk of injustice in
state courts; 3) it is not believed that it can be shown that eliminating diversity jurisdic-
tion would cause any hesitation about crossing state borders because of the traveler's
awareness that he would be losing the protection of his own state courts or that the quality
of courts in a prospective new location is a significant element in the business decision
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is argued, a portion of the task of state administration is assumed by fed-
eral courts and the state's judicial power is less extensive than its legisla-
tive power." It is contended that this disparity threatens to interfere
with the federal plan of state autonomy to promulgate policy through
legislative and judicial processes.' This contention is based on an an-
alogT to Hamilton's argument in favor of coextensive federal judicial
and legislative power to interpret national laws in a uniform manner."8
A second type of possible interference which this note will consider
is that federal decisions could be wrong on the merits of state law and
therefore could be effectively frustrating the enforcement of valid state
policy. This possibility is, of course, the fundamental problem of diver-
sity jurisdiction and is presumably the problem which the Erie R.R. v.
Tompkiis decision" and cases following it 0 sought to solve. Neverthe-
less, it is conceivable that despite this attempted solution, the lower fed-
eral court decisions, which as a practical matter are seldom reviewed by
the Supreme Court of the United States, still do not reflect accurately the
state law which they are supposed to apply. A more subtle problem in
this area is whether the federal decisions in cases in which the applicable
state law is unclear accurately foreshadow the future development of the
law in the state courts. An examination of federal cases in particular
areas of substantive law and a comparison of the federal case results with
state case results in the same areas should reveal whether this possibility
of interference is an actual problem.
The third possibility of interference which this note will consider is
that the federal cases are exercising a kind of coercive influence upon
future state litigation because they are viewed as "precedent" by the state
courts. It is clear that the federal decisions interpreting state law are not
binding upon the state courts; only such validity and effect can be claimed
for the federal judgment as would be due a judgment of the state courts
whether to enter or relocate in a new place; 4) none of the significant prejudices which
beset our society today begins or ends when a state line is crossed.
However, the ALI does not want to abolish diversity jurisdiction. It feels that "gen-
eral diversity jurisdiction should be retained unless it can be asserted with confidence
that the shortcomings of the state court justice which originally gave rise to it no longer
exist to any significant degree." Id. at 52-58.
16. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 235.
17. ALl, DIvISION OF JURIsDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1964) at 49; Note, Diversity Jurisdiction: State Policy and the Independent
Federal Forum, 39 IND. L.J. 582 (1964).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Hamilton). See, ALI, DivISIlON OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964) at 49.
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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under like circumstances. 2 However, some interference with the state
courts might result because the states might accept the federal decision
without critical analysis and give it more deference than a state decision
because it came from a federal court. It seems that this possibility of in-
terference could be evaluated by analyzing the way in which the federal
decisions are treated in the state courts subsequently.
A fourth source of interference might be that federal courts are pre-
venting the development of effective state policy in certain areas because
they are pre-empting substantially all of the litigated cases in those areas
through diversity jurisdiction; but this possibility is treated elsewhere in
this symposium and is not within the scope of this note.
To test the validity of the arguments for interference, research was
initiated by examining all diversity cases in the district courts and the
court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit for the years 1938-1963. Since
considerations of time and bulk of materials precluded an exhaustive sur-
vey of all diversity cases throughout the country, research was focused on
the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit, comprising the states of Illi-
nois, Indiana, and Wisconsin, contains a major metropolitan area, dis-
similar populations, and strong commercial, agricultural, and industrial
economies which provide a wide range of problems and litigation in dif-
ferent substantive areas. The search was extended to state cases within
the Seventh Circuit to see if the states were citing the federal cases and
how the states used them. Court of appeals cases are used more often
than district court cases in this note because the appellate cases were cited
and used more by the states.22 The substantive areas of law into which
the cases seemed to fall are insurance, personal injury, libel, property
rights-real and personal, and family rights.
Insurance
The case of Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.2" in-
volved the problem of how far to extend the definition of "insured," and
the federal court considered what approach the Illinois courts would
21. Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130 (1875).
22. Most of the federal diversity cases applying or construing state law were not
utilized by the states. Of more than 1,200 cases examined by the writer, which were
reported from the court of appeals and the district courts in the Seventh Circuit from
1938-63, only 63 were utilized subsequently by the states. Not all of the 63 cases are
referred to here for two reasons. First, many of them were cited only infrequently by
the states and it was hoped that better results could be obtained by relying on and dis-
cussing those cases which were treated most often by the state courts. Second, many of
the 63 cases did not involve significant unsettled issues of state law.
23. 249 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1957).
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take."4  The problem in the Staizdard case arose when a permittee of an
insured gave another person permission to use the vehicle, and the second
permittee caused the accident. Even though the insured and the first
permittee were covered by the same policy,2" which company was liable
for the injuries caused by the second permittee, who was covered by a
second policy, had to be determined. The court relied on and extended
existing Illinois doctrine, generally known as the "initial permission
rule.""-  Under this rule, the federal court held, where the first permit-
tee was properly given permission to use the car and, in giving the second
permittee permission to use it, did not deviate from the use for which
permission had been initially granted, the second permittee was an "in-
sured" under the owner's policy.27
Both Illinois and Wisconsin dealt with the same problem in their
courts, and they generally followed the rule as set forth in the Standard
case,"8 but some limits were imposed as a matter of policy. In Hays v.
24. Id. at 852. In an earlier unrelated case, Zurich Gen'l Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941), the court faced the problem of construing two
automobile liability policies to determine which insurance company was liable for dam-
ages caused by the insured. Both companies had omnibus clauses in their policies which
covered any vehicle driven by the insured and any person driving the insured's vehicle
with his permission. The issue came to a head when an insured permittee, driving a
separately insured car, caused injury to a third party. The district court held that the
first company to insure the risk was liable, but the court of appeals rejected this standard
but reached the same result by comparing the language in the two policies. The problem
in the court of appeals seems not to have recurred in subsequent state cases, so there
has been no opportunity for state courts to follow the federal case.
25. Illinois statutes require that auto insurance ". . . shall inure to the person
named therein and any other person using or responsible for the use of said motor ve-
hicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of said insured ... " ILL. Ray.
STAT. ch. 9532, § 7-317(b) (1963).
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., which insured the owner of the car that was involved in
the accident, complied with the statutory requirement. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 249 F.2d 847, 848 (7th Cir. 1957).
26. The court relied on Konrad v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 11 Ill. App. 2d 503,
137 N.E.2d 855 (1956). The Konrad case involved personal use of a company vehicle by
the driver after the company permitted him to take it home at night. The Illinois court
concluded that, at the time of the accident, the driver was using the truck with the ex-
press or implied permission of the company and that the driver was an additional insured
under the policy. This conclusion was based on the fact that the company gave the
driver the keys to the truck and therefore could not effectively prohibit its personal use.
Id. at 522, 523, 137 N.E.2d at 865, 866.
However, in the Standard case, even though the initial permittee had permission to
use the car for social purposes and even though the car was being used for social purposes
at the time of the accident, the initial permittee was not driving. The second permittee
was. The federal court held that under the liberal policy adopted by Illinois, it could
be fairly concluded that in the initial permission given to use the car there was an
implied permission for the first permittee to allow the second permittee to drive it.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Gas. Co., supra note 35, at 853.
27. Ibid.
28. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Freeport Ins. Co., 30 I1. App. 2d 69, 173 N.E.2d
546 (1961) ; Hays v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 1, 186 N.E.2d 153 (1962) ;
Hays v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 28 Ill. 2d 601, 192 N.E.2d 855 (1963); Harper v. Hart-
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Country Mut. Ins. Co.,29 an Illinois case, the owner's insurance company
was held to be not liable where a passenger of the first permittee gave the
second permittee permission to use the car, and the second permittee
caused injuries to a third person." The Illinois Supreme Court refused,
as a matter of public policy, to read the requirement of permission out of
the insurance contract, although the plaintiff contended that the require-
ment was purposeless, technical, and fortuitous. The state court held
that a policy holder had no interest in buying protection for those who
used his car without permission and that the initial permission rule suf-
ficed only when permission was granted to that user sought to be brought
within the coverage of the policy.3' Furthermore, it had been held that
the existence of permission in any case was primarily a question of fact. 2
In Wisconsin, recovery against the owner's company was denied where
the second permittee exceeded the limits of his permission. 3
In the Standard case, the federal court was faced with a problem that
had not been treated precisely by the state courts, but the court, at least,
had some state substantive law on which to base its decision even though
the state rule needed expanding to cover the fact situation at bar. This
expansion had some positive effect on two states in the Seventh Circuit.
Both states cited Standard with approval and at the same time limited its
application when the facts of the subsequent cases dictated limitation.
Consequently, it seems safe to say that the Standard case was not only
right on the merits of state law but also did not infringe on state policy
in any way.
ford Acc. & Indem. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 500, 111 N.W.2d 483 (1961); Krebsbach v. Miller,
22 Wis. 2d 171, 125 N.W.2d 41 (1963).
29. 28 Ill. 2d 601, 192 N.E.2d 855 (1963).
30. In the Hays case, the insured, Daily, gave his daughter Eleanor permission to
drive her younger brother and sister into town for a movie. Only Eleanor was to drive,
and she was to return home after the show. In town, Eleanor's brother, without author-
ity from Daily, told two of his friends they could drive the car. Eleanor did not object.
One of the friends was driving when the accident occurred and neither Eleanor, nor her
brother nor her sister were in the car at the time. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed
a directed verdict in favor of the insurance company, but the state supreme court reversed
the appellate court and affirmed the trial court. Id. at 609, 192 N.E.2d at 861.
31. Id. at 607, 608, 192 N.E.2d at 859.
32. Hays v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d at 7, 8, 186 N.E.2d at 156.
33. Harper v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 14 Wis. 2d 500, 111 N.W.2d 480 (1961).
Hartford insured the owner's car, the owner, and anyone driving with the owner's per-
mission. The owner's daughter in Illinois, who did not drive, was induced by one Norton,
to let him take the car home that night to Kenosha, Wis. This was after he had dented
a fender while taking the car to the gas station. Norton was involved in an accident that
night in Racine County, Wis., which was beyond the point to which he was permitted to
drive. Harper, the plaintiff, was a passenger with Norton, sustained injuries, sued him,
and then sued Hartford. On these facts, the court declined to extend the coverage of the
policy. 14 Wis. 2d at 501-503, 111 N.W.2d at 482-483.
NOTES
Personal Injury
Eberhart v. Abshire34 and Burd v. McCulloug.33 involved Indiana
statutes which had not been construed previously by the state courts in
similar fact situations.36 In Eberhart the facts were that the defendant,
eastbound on U.S. 50, stopped his car with his left wheels on the "main
traveled" portion of the highway. He stopped for his own convenience
and not because of any emergency or mechanical failure or bad weather;
and while he was stopped, another driver hit him with such force that the
defendant's car was pushed forward forty feet into the plaintiff's intestate
who was standing on the shoulder of the highway waiting for a bus." Al-
though there was no finding that the defendant had failed to comply
with the statute's requirement that he leave a clear view of his vehicle for
200 feet, the court affirmed the judgment against the defendant."
Adopting an Illinois construction of a statute similar to Indiana's, the
court held that, in spite of the clear view of the defendant's car for 200
feet, the only legally acceptable excuse for stopping on a highway was an
emergency or exigency which left no other choice to the driver.39 And
in a statement of proximate cause, the court held that if the first driver
set in motion a cause which continued down to the instant of the injury
and without which the injury would not have occurred, the first driver
was liable, even though the second driver's negligence contributed to bring
about the plaintiff's injury.4"
The federal court's holding that a driver can violate the Indiana
statute even though he leaves a clear view of 200 feet does not seem to
have been considered by the Indiana courts because in subsequent cases
violations were based upon a finding that the driver had not left a clear
34. 158 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1946).
35. 217 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1954).
36. The Eberhart case construed IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2120 (Burns 1952), which
is a traffic safety statute. The Burd case compared IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-627 (Burns
1946) and IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-605 (Burns 1946).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2120 (Burns 1952) provides that "(a) Upon any highway out-
side of a business or residence district, no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any
vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of the
highway when it is practicable to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off such part of
said highway, but in every event, a sufficient unobstructed width of roadway opposite a
standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of
such stopped vehicle shall be available from a distance of two hundred (200) feet in each
direction upon such highway.
(b) This section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled while
on the paved or improved . . . portion of a highway. . .. ),
37. Eberhart v. Abshire, 158 F.2d 24, 25 (7th Cir. 1946).
38. Id. at 28.
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2120 (Burns 1952). The Illinois counterpart is ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 185 (1963). Eberhart v. Abshire, 158 F.2d 24, 26, 27 (7th Cir. 1946).
40. Eberhart v. Abshire, supra note 39, at 27.
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view of 200 feet; and the state courts consequently never reached the
question of the driver's reason for stopping."' However, the statement
of the federal court about the proximate cause of the injury has been
considered and accepted by the Indiana courts.42
The Burd case involved reconciliation of a 1941 statute of limitations
for malpractice'3 with an 1881" exception to all statutes of limitations
for those under legal disability. Without the benefit of prior Indiana
decisions on this problem or even the decisions of sister states or the con-
structions of similar statutes, the federal court relied on general rules of
statutory construction as announced by the Indiana courts.45 The court
held that the 1941 statute, which was later in time and limited to a spe-
cific situation, prevailed over and repealed the earlier general statute to
the extent that they were inconsistent."
The Indiana courts have not applied the Burd ruling even though
they seem to agree with it. Guy v. Schuldt, 7 an Indiana case, involved a
similar conflict between the 1941 malpractice statute and an 1881 excep-
tion to all statutes of limitations for concealing a cause of action.48 The
defendants, physicians, negligently treated the plaintiff, Guy, in 1941 and
failed to inform him of their mistake. He discovered their error in 1952
41. In Evansville & 0. Valley Ry. v. Woosley, 120 Ind. App. 570, 93 N.E.2d 355
(1950), judgment for the appellee was affirmed. Appellant-defendant stopped its bus
with four wheels on the highway to pickup and discharge passengers. The bus was
obscured from view until one approaching from the rear would be within 75-100 feet.
The car in which plaintiff-appellee's intestate was riding struck the rear of the bus,
causing the death of plaintiff's intestate. The court said that "there was ample evidence
to establish that the appellant in the operation of its bus violated this statute by reason
of the fact that there was evidence that a clear view of such stopped vehicle was not
available for a distance of 200 feet to the drivers of other vehicles." Evansville & 0.
Valley Ry. v. Woosley, supra at 579, 93 N.E.2d at 358.
In Woodrow v. Woodrow, 131 Ind. App. 523, 172 N.E.2d 883 (1961), where a judg-
ment for the defendant was affirmed, the plaintiff stopped his car on the main traveled
portion of a county road. Because of the dry weather at the time, the road was dusty
and the visibility was impaired by the dust raised by plaintiff-appellant's car. The court
held that the plaintiff violated the statute because a clear view of his car was prevented
by the dust. Woodrow v. Woodrow, supra at 531, 172 N.E.2d 883, 886.
42. Northern Ind. Transit, Inc. v. Burke, 228 Ind. 162, 89 N.E.2d 905 (1950);
Evansville & 0. Valley Ry. v. Woosley, 120 Ind. App. 570, 93 N.E2d 355 (1950);
Woodrow v. Woodrow, 131 Ind. App. 523, 172 N.E.2d 883 (1961).
43. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-627 (Burns 1946) "No action of any kind for damages
. . . shall be brought . . . against physicians . . . or others, unless said action is filed
within two years from the date of the act, omission or neglect complained of."
44. In. ANN. STAT. § 2-605 (Burns 1946) "Any person being under legal disabili-
ties when the cause of action accrues may bring his action within two years after the
disability is removed."
45. Burd v. McCullough, 217 F.2d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1954).
46. Ibid.
47. 236 Ind. 101, 138 N.E.2d 891 (1956).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-609 (Burns 1946): "If any person shall conceal the fact
from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any
time within the period of limitation after the discovery of the cause of action."
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and sued in 1954. The physicians pleaded the statute of limitations in
defense, and Guy claimed that the 1881 exception applied. The court
agreed with the Burd conclusion that the malpractice act was not subject
to the 1881 exceptions.4" However, the court noted that Guy contended
that lack of fraud in the Burd case made it distinguishable from his case
and went on to hold that one who had intentionally and fraudulently con-
cealed a cause of action was estopped from relying on a statute of limita-
tions against the action."0
The federal and state courts also have had problems construing a
state statute when there was ample case law on the books. This was the
situation for the Illinois Structural Work Act or Scaffold Act.51 The
major problem presented by the cases was the liability of an owner of
premises who was not in charge of work when an employee of a contrac-
tor was injured. Other problems were what constituted a scaffold and
the legality of an indemnity clause between the contractor and the owner.
The issue of owner's liability regardless of his control over the work
was complicated because the law was in flux. 2 When Bounougias v. Re-
49. Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 101, 105, 138 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1956).
50. Id. at 106-7, 138 N.E.2d at 893-4. The supreme court held that the 1881 statute
could not be considered as an exception to the 1941 statute because the latter was a special
act, absolute in its language, clear and unambiguous. However, the court went on to say
that the interpretation of the statute of limitations should be in accordance with the
principles of equity which "always intervene in such situations to prevent a party from
gaining an advantage by fraudulently concealing an injury wrongfully done another who
has not become aware of it until later. Therefore, the court held that the trial court
erred in sustaining the defendant's demurrer which was based on the 1941 statute. Guy
v. Schuldt, supra, at 105, 111, 112, 138 N.E.2d 891, 893, 897.
In a later case, Guthrie v. Wilson, 240 Ind. 188, 162 N.E.2d 79 (1959), Burd was
distinguished because it did not involve the retroactive effect of the 1941 statute.
51. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1963). "All scaffolds, hoists, cranes . . . or other
mechanical contrivances erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this
state for the use in the erection . . . of any building . . . or other structure, shall be
erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected
• . . and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to the life and limb of any
person . . . employed . . . thereon. . . ."
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 69 (1963): "Any owner, contractor, sub-contractor, fore-
man or . . . other person having charge of the erection, construction, repairing . . . of
any building . . . within the provisions of this act, shall comply with all the terms
thereof ..
"For any injury to person or property, occasioned by any wilful violations of this
act, or wilful failure to comply with any of its provisions, a right of action shall accrue
to the party injured, for any direct damages sustained thereby. ... "
52. Taber v. Defenbaugh, 9 Ill. App. 2d 168, 132 N.E.2d 454 (1956), was a suit
against the owner of premises on which plaintiff's decedent was killed. The appellate
court held that the Scaffold Act required compliance by an owner, contractor, sub-
contractor, foreman, or other person having charge of the building project. The court
continued by saying that before the defendant owner could be held liable, proof had to
be made as to all essential elements. One of these elements was that the defendant
owner actually be in charge of construction.
The United States district court in Schmid v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 81 (F.D.
III. 1957), a non-diversity case, relied on the Taber case as the latest decision by an Il-
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public Steel Corp." was decided, the federal court relied on the most re-
cent Illinois case and earlier decisions which declared a policy to construe
the act liberally and to impose an independent, non-delegable duty of com-
pliance with the statute upon the owner of the premises. 4
Subsequent Illinois cases, Gannon v. Chicago, M. St.P. & Pac. Ry.
and Loveless v. American Tel. & Tel. Co." rejected the construction of
non-delegable owner's duty placed on the statute by the earlier state case
and the Bounougias case,5" and concluded it was not the legislative intent
to hold the owner responsible regardless of who was in charge but to hold
the person in charge responsible whether he was the owner, contractor,
or subcontractor."
Generally, the federal court in the area of personal injuries has prop-
erly followed existing guidelines. Moreover it seems that making and
linois court to support its holding that in order for the plaintiff to recover against the
United States, as owner of the premises on which the plaintiff was injured, plaintiff
would have to show that the United States was in charge of the work. Concluding that
the plaintiff had failed to prove this essential element and should therefore be dismissed,
the court reasoned as follows:
The purpose of the Scaffolding Act is to hold liable any of the named persons
who are in charge of the work. It was not the intention of the legislature that
the owner should be liable regardless of who was in charge of the work, but to
hold the person in charge of the work responsible regardless of whether it was
the owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman, or other person having charge of
the building project. This can be the only logical conclusion. If the legislature
intended otherwise certainly more appropriate and clearer and less ambiguous
language could have been used.
154 F. Supp. at 88. The plaintiff's motion for a new trial was delayed pending the de-
cision by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Ill. 2d 431, 150
N.E.2d 134 (1958).
The Kennerly case, which involved a suit for damages by an employee of a contractor
against the owner of the premises on which the work was being done, held:
The Scaffold Act deals with highly dangerous activities. It has been regarded
from the outset as intended to fix an independent, nondelegable duty of com-
pliance upon the owner of the property and upon each contractor and sub-
contractor engaged in the work. Neither this court nor the Appellate Court has
deviated from this construction of the statute, first announced almost fifty
years ago. . . . We are not at liberty to change the meaning of the language
now. Id. at 436, 150 N.E.2d 134, 137.
However, the Illinois court did not consider the earlier Taber and Schmid cases. As a
result of the Kennerly decision, holding the owner liable, the district court in the Schinid
case held the United States liable, and this holding was affirmed in Schmid v. United
States, 273 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1959).
53. 277 F.2d 726 (7th Cir. 1960).
54. Id. at 729, 732. The court also defined "scaffold" based on the circumstances
of the case and held that indemnity clauses were not against public policy and could be
upheld. Id. at 729-731, 734.
55. 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
56. 40 Ill. App. 2d 347, 189 N.E.2d 679 (1963).
57. Gannon v. Chicago, Mil. St.P. & Pac. Ry., 22 Ili. 2d 305, 319, 320, 175 N.E.2d
785, 793 (1961).
58. Ibid. See note 52 supra. The approach of Bounougias in defining a "scaffold"
under the statute and in allowing indemnity clauses has been followed. Oldham v. Ku-
binski, 37 Ill. App. 2d 65, 185 N.E.2d 270 (1962).
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influencing state policy seemed to be less of a consideration than deter-
mining and applying existing state policy. Yet, when the proper situa-
tion presented itself in the state courts, the state courts, if they saw fit to
do so, changed the rules previously determined by the federal court.
Libel
In influencing litigation in the state, the federal court has had
greater effect in the area of libel than in either the insurance or the per-
sonal injury area. In Spanel v. Pegler," the federal court was faced with
the undecided questions whether, in Illinois, it was libelous per se to write
in an article that a person or a corporation was a communist or communist
sympathizer and, if so, was there a jury question as to whether the article
could be understood by ordinary readers as conveying that meaning."
The court drew an analogy from previous Illinois cases which held that it
was libelous per se to write that a man was an anarchist,"' a socialist, and
a rebel against the prevailing economic system62 and to cast aspersions on
the patriotism of a man or a corporation.6" Believing that what was li-
belous depended on the historical, social, political, and economic context
in which it was written, the court concluded that under current condi-
tions it was libelous per se to write that a man was a communist or com-
munist sympathizer."' The court's approach for determining whether a
particular article conveyed a certain meaning was to consider the article
as a whole, even the headlines."3
Subsequent Illinois cases cited Spanel and agreed with it that to write
that a person was a communist was libelous per se, but they did not extend
the meaning of communist to include "subversive" 6 and "strange com-
pany and wild people ;,,r and the state courts did not apply the Spanel rule
to a case of slander."6
Estill v. Hearst Publ. Co.," a suit for libel and invasion of the right
59. 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1949).
60. Id. at 621.
61. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692 (1891).
62. Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919).
63. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local 2928 USW 152 F.2d 493 (7th Cir.
1945).
64. Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1949).
65. Id. at 623.
66. Dilling v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N.E.2d 635
(1950).
67. Parmelee v. Hearst Publishing Co., Inc., 341 Ill. App. 389, 93 N.E.2d 512 (1950).
68. Ward v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Winnebago County, 13 Ill. App. 2d 257, 141
N.E.2d 753 (1957).
69. 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951). The plaintiff was a former Lake County, Indi-
ana, prosecutor who was embarrassed when John Dillinger made his famous "toy gun!'
escape from the Crown Point, Indiana, jail. The Chicago Herald-Ainerican, in May
1949 ran a series of stories on Dillinger and all those who knew or dealt with him. In-
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of privacy, had less effect than Spanel. The main issue in Estill was
whether the Indiana Newspaper Libel Act" required notification to the
newspaper of an objectionable article as a condition precedent to bringing
a cause of action for libel against the newspaper. The court held that the
purpose of the act was to limit the plaintiff's damages and not to provide
a ground for dismissing a libel suit, and this holding was based apparently
on the fact that the statute was part of the Indiana Civil Code."' The
court agreed with the plaintiff that the act contemplated only "limita-
tion of damages" and was not intended to establish a condition precedent
on his substantive cause of action. This construction has not been ar-
gued in the Indiana courts, so it is not clear whether they would accept it
or reject it. In denying the cause of action for invasion of the right of
privacy, the federal court held that the plaintiff, Estill, was a public fig-
ure in a story of great public interest; and an action for the right of pri-
vacy depends on an invasion of one's private affairs.7" This ruling was
cited in Illinois as an example of a court's denying recovery as a matter of
law when there is a public interest involved. 4
Presently it is impossible to evaluate the possibility of interference
with state judicial process resulting from the Estill decision since a similar
case has not yet appeared in an Indiana court. Evaluation in Spanel indi-
cates no interference. The merits of the substantive rule laid down by
Spanel have not yet been disputed in the courts of Illinois or the Seventh
Circuit generally; the reasoning and historical reflection of the court
showed insight into the state's law of defamation and can certainly be
used as guidelines in future litigation. This is true whether a state
court wants to add another item to the list of things libelous per se or con-
cludes in the light of all the facts and circumstances that writing of a
man that he is a communist, socialist, or anarchist is no longer libelous
per se. Meanwhile, despite acceptance of the general rule, state courts
are still free to decide what words constitute writing of a man that he is
cluded in this series was a 1934 photograph of Estill and Dillinger, taken before the
gunman pulled his famous escape. The story said that, because of this escape, Estill
was laughed out of public office and died a broken man. Id. at 1019.
70. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1043 (Burns 1933) : "Before any suit shall be brought for
the publication of libel in any newspaper in this state, the aggrieved parties shall, at
least three days before filing the complaint in such suit, serve notice in writing on the
publisher . . . specifying the statements in said article which he or they allege to be
false and defamatory. If it shall appear upon trial . . . that said article was published in
good faith . . . and that a full and fair retraction . . . was published within three (3)
days . . . after such mistake . . . was brought to the knowledge of such publisher . . .
then the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damage ... " Id. at 1020.
71. 186 F.2d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 1951).
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Buyinski v. Do-All Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 191, 175 N.E.2d 580 (1961).
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a communist. Thus, the federal decision in Spanel did not infringe upon
state policy but left the door open for the state courts to make state policy
as the cases arose.
Property Rights
The cases involving real and personal property rights were as varied
as those involving personal injuries, but the positive effect of federal
court decisions on subsequent state cases was as great if not greater than
that of the decisions involving libel.
Threedy v. Brennan7 involved the rights of a purchaser in a subdi-
vision where there were no roads leading to Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, to
pass over a public area to get to the lake. The federal court strictly con-
strued an existing restrictive covenant and held that lot owners who pur-
chased with reference to some plat in a subdivision could use common
lands with other lot owners in the subdivision.7" Furthermore, without
Wisconsin cases compelling the federal court to do so, the court refused
to extend the scope of the restrictive covenant to enjoin a use of the
property which was not clearly inconsistent with the specific uses pro-
hibited in the covenant.77
The rule of limiting restrictive covenants to the things restricted, as
proclaimed in Threedy, was held to have decided whether a defendant vio-
lated the covenant in Lake Beulah Protective & Improvement Assn. v.
Christenson." The Wisconsin courts also approved and followed the
Threedy rule that those who bought land with reference to a plat could
enjoy all common lands and access routes shown on the plat."'
The most consistent application of a federal court's construction of
state statutes was in the cases following Baumgarden v. RFC."0 The de-
cision in the Baumgarden case, which was an attempt by the RFC to garn-
ish funds held in trust for Baumgarden, turned on the construction of
two Illinois statutes without a state court decision in point. These
statutes were the Garnishment Act8e ' and the Chancery (Creditors')
75. 131 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1942).
76. Id. at 490.
77. Ibid.
78. 272 Wis. 493, 76 N.W.2d 278 (1956).
79. See Yurmanovich v. Johnston, 19 Wis.2d 494, 120 N.W.2d 711 (1963).
80. 131 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1942).
81. ILL. LAws 1871, at 462. This was repealed by ILL. LAws 1959, at 1956. The
current statutory language is as follows: § 33 "Upon the filing by a judgment creditor or
other person of (a) an affidavit that the affiant believes any person is indebted to thejudgment debtor, other than for wages, or has in his possession, custody or control any
other property belonging to the judgment debtor, or in which the judgment debtor has an
interest, . . . the clerk of the court in which, or the justice of the peace or police
magistrate before whom, the judgment was entered shall issue summons against the per-
son named in the affidavit commanding him to appear before the court as garnishee and
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Act. Noting that the Garnishment Act had been amended to permit
garnishment actions against administrators and executors, the federal
court concluded that if the legislature had intended to permit garnish-
ment against trustees, it would have said so." The court supported its
conclusion by construing the Garnishment Act in connection with the
Creditors' Act, which provided that a creditor could not stop payments
from a trustee to the creditor's debtor when the trust was created in good
faith by someone other than the debtor himself.8 4 Relying on Illinois
cases, the federal court concluded that it was strongly implied that a
garnishment suit against a trust fund was limited in the same manner
and to the same extent as a suit under the Creditors' Act."'
From the outset, Illinois approved and accepted this construction of
state statutes by the federal court.8 6 Even though the federal decision
was not a binding precedent on the state court, Bawmgarden v. American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. held the federal case to be res judicata when the
same facts and parties reappeared in the state court." Subsequent cases
dealing with similar fact situations have applied and reaffirmed the
Bau ngarden rule and the matter appears to be settled within the state.88
In both the Tha reedy and Baumgarden cases, the federal court set out
in a direction not taken by either the state courts or the legislatures. In
Threedy, the court looked for state decisions ordering it to do one thing,
found none, and then decided the issue. In Baumgarden, the court de-
cided the case at bar from an implication derived from earlier cases and
legislative history. The accuracy of the application of state law by the
federal courts is evidenced by the fact that the states which were most
directly involved accepted the federal rulings and applied them as if they
answer the interrogatories in writing under oath."
§ 35 "Administrators and executors may be summoned as garnishees regarding in-
debtedness or other property belonging to an heir or distributee of any estate ..
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 62, § 33, 35 (1963).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 22, § 49 (1941), currently found in ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 22,
§ 49 (1963) : "Whenever an execution shall have been issued against the property of a
defendant, on a judgment . . . and shall have been returned unsatisfied . . . the party
suing out such execution may file a complaint against such defendant . . . to compel
discovery of any property or thing in action due to him, or held in trust for him, and to
prevent the transfer . . . or the payment or delivery thereof to the defendant, except
when such trust has in good faith, 'been created by, or the fund so held in trust has pro-
ceeded from, some person other than the defendant himself .. "
83. Baumgarden v. RFC, 131 F.2d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1942).
84. Ibid. See note 93, szpra.
85. Baumgarden v. RFC, 131 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1942).
86. Dunham v. Kaufman, 385 Ill. 79, 52 N.E.2d 87 (1944) ; Baumgarden v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 135, 54 N.E.2d 86 (1944).
87. Baumgarden v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 86 at 137, 54
N.E.2d at 87.
88. See Hummel v. Cardwell, 390 Ill. 526, 62 N.E.2d 437 (1945); Oppenheim v.
Scully, 337 Ill. App. 587, 86 N.E.2d 431 (1949).
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had been handed down by the state courts. In both cases the federal court
seemed to go as far as it could with the existing state law and when that
was exhausted, the federal court made some law of its own. It did not
appear, however, that the state courts deferred to the federal court or
that they felt bound by the federal decisions, but that they accepted the
federal decisions because it was a good idea to do so. Consequently there
seems to have been no interference with state policy-making.
Family Rights
The decisions in the federal court concerning family rights, unlike
those on property rights, have not been consistently followed in the state
courts; but they have had a significant impact.
In Carter Oil Co. v. Norman,9 the suit was for an injunction against
the defendant's drilling for oil on the plaintiff's land in Illinois; but the
case turned on the court's construction and application of the Adoption
Act.9 The problem was that in 1921 the parents of the defendant adopted
the defendant's son, making the adopted child the half-brother of his
natural mother while the adoptive parents were kindred by blood to the
adopted child.9 The court upheld the validity of the 1921 proceedings
since nobody had questioned them for nineteen years and rejected the
argument that the 1921 proceedings were void because the natural father's
consent had not been obtained.2 The federal court felt that Illinois in-
tended to have a liberal adoption policy and would not set aside the 1921
proceedings or any transfers of property that had been made in reliance
on them.
Since the Carter case, the adoption statute in Illinois has been
changed ;"1 but the Illinois courts have approved and relied on the liberal
policy that was announced in that case and have adopted it as that of
Illinois."2 The case also has been used as authority for issues that were
not squarely faced in the decision."6
89. 131 F.2d 451 (7th Cir. 1942).
90. ILL. LAWS 1874, at 128. These sections have been revised and are now part of
the Probate Act, § 14, and are found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 14 (1963).
91. Carter Oil Co. v. Norman, 131 F.2d 451, 453, 454 (7th Cir. 1942).
92. Id. at 456.
93. Id. at 455.
94. See note 90 supra.
95. In Re Estate of Wolfner, 44 Ill. App. 2d 77, 194 N.E.2d 3 (1963).
96. See In Re Petition of Stern, 2 Ill. App. 2d 311, 120 N.E.2d 64 (1954) ; In Re
Simaner, 16 I1. App. 2d 48, 147 N.E.2d 422 (1957) ; In Re Petition of Jambrone, 17
Ill. App. 2d 104, 149 N.E.2d 409 (1958).
The Stern case cited Carter among others, for the proposition that where the record
in an adoption proceeding shows at least substantial compliance with the provisions of the
adoption act, an adoption decree is secure from collateral attack. The Sinaner case re-
lied on Carter for the rule that when the mother signed the consent to adoption the puta-
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Daily v. Parker" is the only case found in this study where the fed-
eral court took a giant step in making new state policy. The court con-
sidered for the first time and granted a cause of action to children, suing
via their mother as next friend, against a married woman who had en-
ticed their father away from their home in Pennsylvania to cohabit with
her in Chicago.9" Since the state courts and legislature had not acted in
this matter, the federal court felt free to do so. Moreover, the federal
court felt its duty was to decide, not to avoid questions.99 The court re-
lied on historical changes in the statug of members of the family, judicial
empiricism as set forth in Pound's Spirit of the Common Law, and un-
willingness to deny the cause of action simply because the right had not
been previously granted."00
Despite this breakthrough, the Illinois courts were reluctant to ac-
cept the federal decision as binding precedent when almost identical facts
came up in the state court in Johnson v. Luhnan. Although the Illinois
court granted the cause of action, it did so irrespective of the Daily case;
rather the court relied on a "judicious" interpretation of the common law,
an analogous Illinois case, the Illinois constitution, and "consistency" with
the "precedent" set by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals."0 2 In a
later case, the Illinois court refused to follow Daily to grant an additional
cause of action where the parties were covered by the wrongful death
statute.
103
In Wisconsin, Daily was the basis for a trial court's granting of a
cause of action to a daughter who sued the mistress of her divorced father
for alienating his affections from her. The supreme court reversed, re-
lying on the common law rule that denied such a cause of action, the
weight of authority which also denied it, and the argument that creation
tive father had no rights under the statute with reference to the adoption or custody of
the child. And Jambrotte used Carter to say that under the previous adoption statute, the
consent of the natural father was not required to adopt an illegitimate child.
97. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
98. Id. at 175.
99. Id. at 177.
100. Id. at 177, 183.
101. 330 IIl. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947).
102. Id. at 604-607, 71 N.E2d at 813. The Illinois court seemed to rely on a case
that arose after Daily, although the facts there were not as similar to those in the
Johnson case as were those in Daily. The case was Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68
N.E.2d 464 (1946), in which a husband sued for damages for the alienation of his wife's
affections. Quoting from the Heck case, the court in the Johnson case held that all mem-
bers of the family have a right to protect the family relationship and that designation
obviously includes the minor children as well as the respective spouses, who, heretofore
were the only parties entitled to assert such rights.
103. Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958). The statute involved
was ILL. IEv. STAT. ch. 70, para. 1, 2 (1963).
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of new rights is a question for the legislature, not the courts.'
In Seymour v. Union. News Co.,"0 5 the federal court was again faced
with the problem of granting a new cause of action when a wife sued for
loss of consortium at common law and for recovery of medical expenses
paid for her husband. Relying on prior Illinois cases to decide both
issues, the court denied the suit based on loss of consortium but granted
an action for recovery of medical expenses paid under a state statute.10
The basis for the federal court's decision on the Illinois statute was that
the wife's cause of action for expenses was separate from her husband's
suit for negligence and was not barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions for personal injuries."0 7 The Seymour holding and reasons for it
have generally been accepted in Illinois.'
Illinois, however, changed its earlier stand and granted a cause of
action to a wife for loss of consortium in Dini v. Naiditch. °9 Despite
the Seymour case, the Illinois court regarded the Dini case as essentially
one of first impression. The decision rested on the present equal status
of men and women in society and the argument that the wife's conjugal
interest merits the same protection as that of the husband. Furthermore,
the court felt that if the law protected intentional invasions of conjugal
rights, as in alienation of affections, it could not deny protection to the
same interest due to negligent invasion."'
The family rights cases illustrate graphically two of the three pos-
sible areas of interference considered in this note. The Carter court was
forced to find the Illinois adoption policy and the accuracy of its finding
was confirmed when Illinois courts later approved it. In Daily, the fed-
eral court found that Illinois law would support a cause of action that
had not yet been recognized by state courts. When facts nearly the
104. Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953). There were other
facts in this case which, it is believed, influenced the supreme court as much as the
common law rule and the weight of authority. The plaintiff's father supported her for
seven years after the divorce until he took the defendant as his mistress in 1941. From
1941 until his death in 1952, the plaintiff's father and the defendant were man and mis-
tress, but no suit was brought until after he died. When the plaintiff sued, she based
her action on strained relations between her and her father and deprivation of love, aid,
support, and education; and she asked for $100,000 damages.
105. 217 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1954).
106. The federal court felt bound by Patelski v. Snyder, 179 Ill. App. 24 (1913), in
denying a suit to the wife for loss of consortium because no Illinois Supreme Court
case had overruled it. The court also relied on Thompson v. City of Bushnell, 346 Ill.
App. 352, 105 N.E.2d 311 (1952), to grant the plaintiff recovery under the Family Ex-
pense Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 15 (1963).
107. Seymour v. Union News Co., supra note 116, at 170.
108. See Saunders v. Schultz, 22 Ill. App. 2d 402, 161 N.F_.8d 129 (1959) ; Saunders
v. Schultz, 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
109. 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
110. Id. at 430, 170 N.E.2d at 892.
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same as Daily's came before the state court the cause of action was al-
lowed and the accuracy of the Daily court's finding of state law was con-
firmed. At the same time, since the state court reached its decision ir-
respective of Daily, the inference of possible interference with the state
court's policy-making resulting from an opinion wrong on the merits of
state law was negated. The possibility that federal precedents have a co-
ercive effect on state courts similarly was negated when a Wisconsin
court refused to follow Daily and when, in the Dini case, an Illinois court
did not hesitate to break with precedent which included not only state
cases but also a federal case and created a new cause of action.
Conclusion,
The federal court in all the areas discussed attempted to decide these
diversity cases in accordance with state law. When there was no state
law on point, the court sought analogous situations in other cases in the
jurisdiction or other guidelines for interpretation. The court's perform-
ance should not be judged by its "success" or "failure" in influencing
state litigation, because the federal court is not competing with the states
either to decide more cases or to be the overseer and dictator of state
policy.111 Rather, the court should be judged on how it adhered to exist-
ing state policy, how it made efforts to ascertain that policy, and how it
took a new course when the state policy could not be determined.
This study reveals no underlying policy among the states to adopt the
federal court's construction of state statutes or to adopt rulings on cases
at common law simply because there was a federal court exercising di-
versity jurisdiction. Whenever the proper case presented itself in the
state court and the state court felt compelled to construe the law differ-
ently from the federal court or to limit the application of the federal de-
cision, this was done. Similarly, there is no policy of rejecting the fed-
eral decisions as an imposition on state autonomy, sovereignty, or juris-
diction. This is because the federal diversity decisions are entitled only
to such effect in the state courts as would be due a judgment of the
state courts under like circumstances. Hence it seems that federal deci-
sions do not influence state litigation unless the state wants them to.
Where a previous federal decision was rejected, the rejection resulted
either from distinctions on the merits of the case at bar in the state court
or from a change of mind by the state in its view of the law.
While it might not be possible to say that federal diversity cases have
no influence whatsoever on similar cases brought subsequently in state
111. See ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED-
ERAL CoURTs (Tent. Draft No. 1, Appendix A, 1963).
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courts, it does seem reasonable to say that federal diversity cases have not
interfered with state judicial process. Federal courts, even where they
were working in areas of first impression, seemed to find state law cor-
rectly. Later approval of federal decisions by state courts tends to indi-
cate that federal decisions were not wrong on the merits of state law. At
the same time, it was apparent that state courts did not consider them-
selves in any way bound to follow federal precedents. That federal de-
cisions do not have a coercive effect is illustrated by a state court's reach-
ing a result identical to that of a federal court although the state court
considered the problem one of first impression and based its decision on
reasons different from those of the federal court.
As noted before, the state cases that have utilized the federal cases
are very few. This could mean that the federal courts are not exercising
much influence on the states and consequently are having very little ef-
fect on state litigation. The failure to utilize federal cases could also
mean that the fact situations in the federal cases do not recur in the state
courts, but this explanation seems unlikely as a general proposition.
Those cases that were not utilized by the states generally fell into the same
categories that have been discussed here. Like the ones that were sub-
sequently utilized, they relied as much as possible on existing state law and
drew analogies from other areas where there was no state case or statute
in point. The fact that these cases were not referred to in later state de-
cisions seems to indicate that the federal court did not interfere with sub-
sequent state litigation. Furthermore, it seems that those state cases that
did rely on the federal decisions did so not because a federal court ren-
dered the decision but because the federal decision was well-reasoned and
just, and the state court might have followed it anyway.
In view of this study, the argument that federal diversity jurisdic-
tion interferes with state autonomy seems to have limited merit. It is
true that if a litigant is denied life, liberty, or property because the federal
court follows state law, the litigant is not restored by the fact that "intel-
ligent state judges later refuse to apply that doctrine to other liti-
gants. .. ."I' However, while in such a situation the interference with
an individual defendant may be substantial, the interference with the
state's judicial power is certainly minimal, for the state is at liberty to ac-
cept or reject the federal decision on the state law the next time the prob-
lem appears in the state courts," 8 just as state courts may reconsider their
112. Corbin, The Laws of the Sdveral States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 775 (1941).
113. Corbin, supra note 112, at 776. The point is made that conflict between fed-
eral and state courts is not avoided by requiring the federal judges to ascertain and fol-
low state law. It avoids conflict with a former judicial decision, but when the state
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
own holdings and change the law if the conditions so warrant. Further-
more, this minimal interference is unavoidable so long as the United
States is organized on federal principles. Even if diversity jurisdiction
were abolished, a similar type of "interference with state autonomy" would
still exist when, under conflict of laws rules, the policies of one state gov-
erned litigation occurring in another state. Consequently, although it is
true that for each diversity case decided in a federal court the state's judi-
cial power may not be coextensive with its legislative power, the lack of co-
extensiveness seems to be neither substantial nor harmful. If diversity
jurisdiction is to be abolished or changed, it should not be done because of
interference with state autonomy, at least as far as state litigation is
concerned.
The ALT proposal to limit diversity jurisdiction is but one of many
that have been offered and accepted or rejected. Any decision by Con-
gress to change or not to change diversity jurisdiction will affect the
functioning and the "scope and limits" of the federal judiciary; and this
in turn will undoubtedly affect the "happy relation" of states to nation,
which is not only our "abiding political problem" but is also the basis of
our federal system." 4 In view of this result of such a change, it is sug-
gested that the reasons underlying it should be the subject of special
scrutiny. The study presented in this note suggests that the ALI appre-
hension regarding the effect of present diversity jurisdiction on state
autonomy is perhaps unwarranted. Therefore, unless other conditions
justify the proposed revision of diversity jurisdiction it seems that its
suggested redistribution of judicial power might accomplish an un-
intended and unanticipated result.
APPENDIX: STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION
I. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CASE LOADS
The American Law Institute contends that the federal courts are in-
terfering with state court autonomy through the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction. While the nature of this interference is never specified, one
possibility is that a significant interference would result if the federal
court subsequently changes its view of the law, there is a new conflict. And as to this,
"Conflict with the past is to be preferred over conflict with the future." Id. at 776.
114. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
